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In 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court cleared up any 
ambiguity regarding the application of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA)1 in Minnesota state courts, but also waded into untested 
water (at least in Minnesota) regarding whether allegations that a 
contract was void must be arbitrated.2  In a decision that sought to 
retain some power for state law and state courts within the highly 
deferential federal arbitration framework, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC3 sided with a few federal circuit 
courts4 and held that litigants who allege that their contracts are 
void may initially ignore the arbitration clauses included in those 
 
       †  Liz Kramer is an attorney at Leonard, Street and Deinard, practicing both 
construction and general business litigation.  After receiving her law degree from 
the Yale Law School, Ms. Kramer clerked at the Minnesota Supreme Court during 
the year that Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC was decided.  Since that time she has 
litigated issues of arbitrability on multiple occasions. 
 1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 2. See Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra Part I (discussing these cases). 
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contracts.5  But just two-and-one-half years later, the United States 
Supreme Court declared that the space Minnesota had attempted 
to claim as the province of state law had already been annexed by 
the FAA and the Supreme Court interpretation of the FAA.6  This 
article will explore what remains of the Onvoy decision. 
First, understanding Onvoy’s context requires a brief 
introduction to the federal severability doctrine and the case law 
interpreting it. 
I. PRIMA PAINT AND THE CIRCUITS’ ATTEMPTS TO NARROW IT 
The FAA provides that a party aggrieved by the failure of 
another to arbitrate may petition a United States district court and 
“upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the 
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration.”7  Under federal precedent, there is a strong 
presumption of arbitrability, and doubts about the scope of 
arbitrable issues are resolved in favor of arbitration.8  The cases 
covered in this article discuss whether the threshold issue regarding 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement must also be heard 
by an arbitrator or whether, in some instances, it can be heard by a 
court. 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided in Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.9 that a party 
resisting arbitration could not obtain a court hearing on all the 
issues by asserting that the party had been fraudulently induced to 
enter into the contract containing the arbitration provision.10  
Instead, the Supreme Court introduced what has since been 
termed the “severability doctrine,” under which the arbitration 
clause of a contract is essentially considered separately from the 
 
 5. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354.  
 6. See infra Part III (discussing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 
126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006)). 
 7. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
 8. E.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 
24–25 (1983) (noting that “questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a 
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration” and “any doubts 
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract 
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”). 
 9. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 10. Id. at 403–04. 
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remainder of the contract.11  Only if the arbitration clause itself can 
be attacked—such as, if a party was fraudulently induced to agree to 
arbitration—may a court entertain the issue of arbitrability under 
the Prima Paint decision.12  The Supreme Court used broad 
language in holding “therefore, that in passing upon a [9 U.S.C.]   
§ 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court 
may consider only issues relating to the making and performance 
of the agreement to arbitrate.”13 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, some courts balked at the rigidity 
of the severability doctrine.  The Ninth Circuit confronted a case in 
1991 in which California municipalities sought to avoid the 
arbitration clause in each of their agreements with a securities 
company by alleging that the individual who signed the agreements 
on behalf of the municipalities lacked authority to bind them.14  
The Ninth Circuit allowed the municipalities to make their 
argument in court.  The court limited the application of Prima 
Paint to “challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a contract” and 
conversely found that the severability doctrine did not apply to 
“challenges going to the very existence of a contract.”15  The court 
summarized its distinction by stating that Prima Paint applies to 
“voidable” contracts.16 
The Third Circuit later explicitly addressed which types of 
complaints regarding a contract’s enforceability would be allowed 
to stay arbitration under the FAA in Sandvik AB v. Advent 
International Corp.17  In Sandvik, the two parties had executed a joint 
venture agreement with a mandatory arbitration clause.18  But less 
than three months after the agreement was signed, Advent notified 
Sandvik that the individual who signed the agreement for Advent 
had done so without authority and that Advent, therefore, would 
not abide by its terms.19  Sandvik brought suit for breach of 
contract, and Advent moved to compel arbitration.20  The Third 
Circuit noted a potential conflict in this case between the federal 
 
 11. See id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 404. 
 14. Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1138 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
 15. Id. at 1140. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 18. Id. at 101. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 101–02. 
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rule that “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any 
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit”21 and the severability 
doctrine of Prima Paint.22  Because Sandvik did not raise an issue 
that went “to the making and performance of the agreement to 
arbitrate,” as required by Prima Paint,23 a plain reading of Supreme 
Court precedent suggested Sandvik and Advent would have to 
arbitrate. 
The Third Circuit resolved the potential conflict by 
“conclud[ing] that the doctrine of severability presumes an 
underlying, existent, agreement.”24  After citing approvingly to the 
Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton & Co.25 decision 
out of the Ninth Circuit, the Third Circuit “dr[e]w a distinction 
between contracts that are asserted to be ‘void’ or non-existent . . . 
and those that are merely ‘voidable,’ as was the contract at issue in 
Prima Paint [sic], for purposes of evaluating whether the making of 
an arbitration agreement is in dispute.”26  Having set out that 
framework, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a 
motion to compel arbitration because the agent’s lack of authority 
voided the agreement.27 
The Second Circuit addressed a similar set of facts just a year 
after the Sandvik decision in Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. Clarendon 
National Insurance Co.28  In that case, Sphere Drake, a reinsurance 
company, authorized Euro International Underwriting to accept 
business on its behalf.29  Euro then entered into six reinsurance 
contracts in 1997 and 1998, under which Sphere Drake reinsured 
workers’ compensation insurance policies issued by Clarendon.30  
More than a year after the last contracts were executed, Sphere 
Drake contacted Clarendon and attempted to nullify the contracts, 
alleging that Euro never should have entered into them.31  There 
was an arbitration clause in each contract, and after Clarendon 
demanded arbitration, Sphere Drake brought an action in district 
 
 21. Id. at 105 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 
U.S. 643, 648 (1986)). 
 22. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 105. 
 23. Id. (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404). 
 24. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 106. 
 25. 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1991).  
 26. Sandvik, 220 F.3d at 107. 
 27. Id. at 111–12. 
 28. 263 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 29. Id. at 28. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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court seeking a declaration that the contracts were void.32  Sphere 
Drake contended that Euro breached its fiduciary duty by failing to 
evaluate the reasonableness of the risks and, therefore, executed 
contracts that were “economically disastrous” for Sphere Drake.33  
Sphere Drake argued was that the contracts were void because the 
agent acted outside the scope of its agency, and the opposing party 
was aware that the agent was acting outside of its authority.34 
In analyzing whether Sphere Drake had to arbitrate, the 
Second Circuit noted that “the party putting the agreement to 
arbitrate in issue must present ‘some evidence’ in support of its 
claim before a trial is warranted.”35  In addition, it said that Prima 
Paint can only be harmonized with cases saying that there must be 
an agreement to arbitrate before it can be enforced by recognizing 
“the distinction between void and voidable contracts.”36  The 
Second Circuit held that “[i]f a party alleges that a contract is void 
and provides some evidence in support, then the party need not 
specifically allege that the arbitration clause in that contract is void, 
and the party is entitled to a trial on the arbitrability issue.”37  
Applying its interpretation of Prima Paint, the Second Circuit found 
that Sphere Drake had only asserted evidence to suggest that one 
of the six reinsurance contracts was void.38  Sphere Drake only 
offered evidence that Clarendon’s agent knew Euro was exceeding 
its authority on one contract, not all six, so a trial was warranted 
about the enforceability of only that one arbitration clause.39 
At this point, after at least three circuit courts had endorsed 
the “void/voidable” distinction with respect to Prima Paint’s 
application, the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to address 
that issue in Onvoy. 
II. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S ENDORSEMENT OF THE 
VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION IN ONVOY V. SHAL 
Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC40 forced the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to confront the overlap between state and federal arbitration 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 29. 
 34. Id. at 33. 
 35. Id. at 30. 
 36. Id. at 31. 
 37. Id. at 32. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 32–33. 
 40. 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).  
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law—something the court had not done in over two decades.  In 
overturning decisions from 1972 and 1982 regarding the 
application of the Minnesota Arbitration Act,41 Onvoy clarified that 
the FAA42 “applies to all transactions that involve or affect interstate 
commerce.”43  That leaves very few transactions governed by the 
Minnesota Arbitration Act:44 only those involving goods, labor and 
supplies, exclusively from Minnesota, with only Minnesota 
participants in the transaction.  Even then, a clever litigator could 
still argue for the application of federal law by showing how a 
provincial transaction “affects” interstate commerce.45  In addition 
to the applicability of the FAA, the substantive federal law of 
arbitration also applies in Minnesota state courts.46 
The critical aspects of Onvoy remain unchanged: Minnesota 
courts must apply, with rare exception, the FAA and the federal law 
interpreting it to disputes over the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses.  The more groundbreaking and interesting aspects of 
Onvoy, however, involved the void/voidable distinction regarding 
the enforceability of arbitration clauses.  The issue in Onvoy was the 
impact of Onvoy’s arguments that its contract with SHAL was void 
ab initio due to claims that the contract had been entered into ultra 
vires and by interested directors.47  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Sandvik,48 such 
adoption recognizing the unfairness of forcing parties to adhere to 
any provision of a void contract—even the arbitration provision.49  
Following Sandvik, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Onvoy 
 
 41. MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08–.30 (2006).  
 42. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 43. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Minn. 2003) (citing 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1995)). 
 44. MINN. STAT. §§ 572.08–.30. 
 45. This argument would be made using commerce clause cases like Wickard 
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which held that legislation restricting the uses of 
even small amounts of home-grown wheat by farmers for local consumption could 
impact interstate commerce.  Id. at 127–29.  A more recent example of this is 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Controlled Substances Act could be constitutionally applied even to marijuana 
grown by the intended user in a state where medical marijuana use is legal.  Id. at 
20–33. 
 46. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 351 n.4 (citing Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272). 
 47. Id. at 347. 
 48. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 106–08 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 49. Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354 (holding that “parties may not be compelled to 
arbitrate claims if they have alleged that the contract at issue never legally 
existed”). 
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declared that “allegations that a contract is void may be heard by a 
court, even if not specifically directed to the arbitration clause, 
while allegations that a contract is voidable must be sent to 
arbitration.”50  The void/voidable distinction implicates state law 
because contract interpretation is governed by state, not federal, 
law.51 
Applying those legal holdings to the facts of Onvoy, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided that Onvoy’s claim that the 
contract was entered into without authority was not sufficient to 
make the contract void.52  Minnesota law recognizes two types of 
ultra vires contracts: under the first, the contract will always be 
outside the scope of the corporation’s power; under the second, 
the contract is generally within the corporation’s power, but the 
power was defectively exercised in that particular instance.53  
Onvoy’s claim was of the second type—an allegation that the board 
of directors had not properly followed protocol in approving the 
contract—and was, therefore, not automatically void in the opinion 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.54  Onvoy’s second claim, that the 
individuals who negotiated the contract engaged in self-dealing 
because they had close associations with SHAL, is governed by 
Minnesota Statutes section 302A.255.55  The statute creates the 
possibility that a transaction is void due to self-dealing, but also sets 
out four safe harbor provisions for accused parties.56  Therefore, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded to the district court to 
determine whether the contract was void as a result of an 
interested-director decision that was not excused by any of the safe 
harbor provisions.57 
In the course of its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
expressed unease with federal law on arbitration.58  In footnote six 
of the decision, the court cited a number of critiques of the federal 
policy favoring arbitration and noted that its new rule “allowing 
courts to retain jurisdiction over credible claims that a contract is 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 355. 
 53. Id. at 354–55 (citing Bell v. Kirkland, 102 Minn. 213, 218, 113 N.W. 271, 
273 (1907)). 
 54. Id. at 355. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 355–56. 
 57. Id. at 356. 
 58. See id. at 352. 
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void[] leaves room for consumers to escape obvious abuses of 
power in contracting.”59  The unease was more pronounced in the 
concurrence of Justice Paul Anderson, who wrote about his 
“concerns regarding the potential for abuse of power when parties 
with unequal bargaining power contract to arbitrate their 
disputes.”60  In particular, he expressed concern about individuals 
waiving the right to a jury trial by agreeing to arbitration.61 
Justice Gilbert also wrote separately (dissenting in part) to 
criticize the case law implementing the Federal Arbitration Act.62  
He said the statute “lends too much power to an arbitration system 
that does not properly account for impartiality and a lack of legal 
oversight.”63  Because he thought federal law was headed in the 
wrong direction, Justice Gilbert wanted Minnesota courts to “be 
vigilant to preserve and improve Minnesota’s ADR system . . . and    
. . . not be so eager to defer to the federal system unless clearly 
required under federal law.”64 
Because of the policy statements from the Minnesota Supreme 
Court suggesting concerns about state courts automatically sending 
all parties to arbitration, the court’s decision to adopt the 
void/voidable distinction can be seen in part as an attempt to 
retain some power for state courts and lawmakers over who must 
arbitrate.  In a decision that acknowledges that Minnesota’s own 
arbitration statute is rendered nearly impotent by the FAA, but that 
expresses concern about the knee-jerk federal policy in favor of 
arbitration, the court adopts the void/voidable distinction as an 
exercise in drawing a line in the sand to demarcate a space for state 
law on arbitration.65  Indeed, given the legal framework created by 
the United States Supreme Court, the void/voidable distinction 
may be the only vehicle for safeguarding Minnesota citizens from a 
federal judiciary that could be called overzealous in its preference 
for arbitration. 
 
 59. Id. at 352 n.6. 
 60. Id. at 357 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 359 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Onvoy, 699 N.W.2d at 344–59. 
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III. BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING REAFFIRMS PRIMA PAINT AND REJECTS 
THE VOID/VOIDABLE DISTINCTION 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court decided whether a 
claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision was void 
for illegality should go to the arbitrator or be heard by a district 
court.66  In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,67 a putative class 
of plaintiffs entered into deferred-payment transactions with 
Buckeye Check Cashing, and their agreements all contained 
arbitration provisions.68  The plaintiffs sued in Florida state court 
alleging that the agreements violated Florida lending and 
consumer-protection statutes.69  Buckeye responded by moving to 
compel arbitration.70  The Florida Supreme Court refused to 
compel arbitration because it worried that enforcing the 
arbitration clause of an illegal contract “could breathe life into a 
contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in 
nature.”71 
In a brief opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed 
the Florida high court, rejecting the void/voidable distinction and 
standing firmly on Prima Paint.72  The Court repeated three 
fundamental propositions on arbitration: 1) an arbitration clause 
can be severed from the balance of the contract; 2) “unless the 
challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the 
contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first 
instance;” and 3) these rules apply in state and federal courts.73  
After noting that the Florida Supreme Court relied on the 
conclusion that the assertions of illegality would render the 
Buckeye agreements void, the Court said unambiguously: “Prima 
Paint makes this conclusion irrelevant.  That case rejected 
application of state severability rules to the arbitration agreement 
without discussing whether the challenge at issue would have 
rendered the contract void or voidable.”74  The Court emphasized 
 
 66. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204 (2006). 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1207. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 894 So. 2d 860, 
862 (Fla. 2005)). 
 72. Id. at 1208–11 (2006) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
 73. Id. at 1209. 
 74. Id. (citing Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400–04). 
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that federal substantive law is applicable in state courts and that its 
arbitration precedent had rejected the view that the severability 
doctrine could be altered by state law.75 
The Supreme Court also addressed the respondents’ argument 
that, since section 2 of the FAA76 limits the FAA’s application to 
“contracts,” it is explicitly presumed that a valid contract exists.77  
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, refused to “read ‘contract’ so 
narrowly.”78  Considering all the uses of the term “contract” in 
section 2, the Court concluded that the term “must include 
contracts that later prove to be void.”79 
Interestingly, however, the Court did include a footnote that 
gave credence to the logical argument that someone should not 
have to abide by an arbitration clause in a contract that never 
existed: 
The issue of the contract’s validity is different from the 
issue of whether any agreement between the alleged 
obligator and obligee was ever concluded.  Our opinion 
today addresses only the former, and does not speak to 
the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents . . . 
which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the 
alleged obligator ever signed the contract, whether the 
signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal, 
and whether the signor lacked the mental capacity to 
assent.80 
Among other cases, the Court cited to both Sandvik81 and Sphere 
Drake82 in the footnote.83  Despite its strong language in the opinion 
dismissing the void/voidable distinction created by lower courts, 
the Court in footnote one recognizes (but does not address) that 
there may be instances in which a party’s challenge to the contract 
as a whole can be heard by the courts.84  But if those instances exist, 
the Court apparently thinks they are very narrow. 
The Supreme Court’s holding, read together with the 
footnote, suggests that the Court rejected the void/voidable 
 
 75. Id. at 1208–09. 
 76. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).  
 77. Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1209–10. 
 78. Id. at 1210. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1208 n.1 (internal citations omitted). 
 81. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 82. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 83. Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1. 
 84. Id. 
10
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distinction because the legal term “void” encompasses a greater 
universe of cases than the Supreme Court thinks should be heard 
by a court under the FAA.  The instances in which a contract is 
void, or of no effect, are defined by state contract law and can 
include those that are against public policy, like that in Buckeye.  
But Justice Scalia seems more sympathetic toward contracts that are 
null and void because there never was a meeting of the minds.  The 
Supreme Court appears to be deferring for another day its decision 
on whether an assertion that the party never assented to the 
contract containing the arbitration clause, or that the signor lacked 
authority, should be determined by an arbitrator. 
Where, then, would the claims that Onvoy made regarding 
why its contract was void fall—on the “clearly arbitrable” side of the 
line drawn by the United States Supreme Court (along with 
illegality), or on the “we’ll decide another day” side of the line?  
Onvoy’s claims that its contract was entered into ultra vires, or 
beyond the scope of authority, seem clearly analogous to the claim 
in Sphere Drake that Sphere Drake’s agents acted outside their 
authority.85  Given that Sphere Drake was one of the cases cited in 
footnote one of the Buckeye decision, an ultra vires claim (which the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found could be heard by a court) 
appears still up for discussion.  This type of claim is, accordingly, 
on the “decide another day” side of the line. 
Onvoy’s second argument, that its contract was entered into by 
interested directors,86 straddles the line and illustrates how little 
clarity the Supreme Court provided in the Buckeye decision about 
the types of allegations impacting an entire contract that deserve a 
court hearing.  Unlike the cases in which the principal did not 
assent to an agreement, the nullifying of a contract entered into by 
interested directors is primarily a public policy determination of 
the legislature.  As such, this argument could be an “illegality” 
argument that falls on the “clearly arbitrable” side of the line 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Buckeye.  But to the extent that 
self-dealing is also a breach of fiduciary duty and an activity that 
falls outside of an agent’s authority, Onvoy’s second argument 
could also be analogized to Sphere Drake and fall on the “decide 
another day” side of Buckeye. 
 
 85. See Sphere Drake, 256 F.3d at 588; Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 354–55. 
 86. See Onvoy, 669 N.W.2d at 355–56. 
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IV. HOW MINNESOTA COURTS AND LITIGATORS MAY PROCEED 
Given this current framework, what space can a Minnesota 
court legitimately claim as open for deciding the enforceability of 
an arbitration clause?  How can a litigator best argue that an 
arbitration clause is either ineffective or must be enforced? 
Armed with the Buckeye decision,87 a party favoring arbitration 
in state court may argue that the Onvoy decision88 has been 
effectively overruled.  A close read of both decisions, however, 
indicates that there is still some gray area that the Supreme Court 
intentionally did not address.  If a court finds that no “agreement 
between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded,”89 the 
court may refuse a motion to compel arbitration and instead hold a 
trial on the enforceability of the arbitration clause. 
The courts have not been given much direction on which 
circumstances indicate that no agreement was concluded.  A safe 
bet, however, is that a party will include an argument that the 
signature on the contract containing the arbitration provision was 
forged, the person signing the contract lacked authority, the 
person signing clearly exceeded his or her authority, or the person 
signing was a minor or was otherwise legally incapable of 
consenting.  There are probably dozens of scenarios similar to 
those just delineated that will require courts and litigators to make 
analogies and closely parse the few words of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
For litigators attempting to compel arbitration, the key will be 
to hammer home Buckeye’s affirmation of Prima Paint and to state 
that, unless the alleged impropriety goes to the arbitration clause 
itself, courts should compel arbitration.  For litigators arguing for a 
court hearing on the enforceability of the arbitration clause, the 
key will be to fit themselves into the first footnote of Buckeye90 by 
analogizing their situations to those of Sandvik91 and Sphere Drake.92 
In any case, it is evident that the void/voidable distinction is 
no longer a valid test of the enforceability of a contract containing 
an arbitration clause.  The United States Supreme Court struck 
down that bright-line rule and replaced it with the murky test of 
 
 87. Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1204. 
 88. Onvoy, Inc. v. SHAL, LLC, 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).  
 89. Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 92. Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001). 
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“whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded.”93  While the 
Court’s decision was meant to narrow the situations in which a 
party to a contract calling for arbitration could be heard in court, it 
is still not clear which allegations are sufficient to entitle a litigant 
to a court hearing.  This is not exactly bad news for the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, to the extent that the justices still have concerns 
about sending some types of would-be litigants to arbitration, 
because the United States Supreme Court left room within 
footnote one for state courts to apply their own contract law and 
determine “whether any agreement . . . was ever concluded”94 
between the two parties to the alleged arbitration clause.  
Therefore, the void/voidable rule enunciated in Onvoy, Inc. v. 
SHAL, LLC95 is no longer valid.  That does not, however, mean the 
Minnesota Supreme Court cannot use it generally as precedent to 
mandate court trials in cases in which one party to an arbitration 
clause alleges a fundamental problem with the contract as a whole. 
 
 
 93. Buckeye Check Cashing, 126 S. Ct. at 1208 n.1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 669 N.W.2d 344 (Minn. 2003).  
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